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Fitch Assigns Final Ratings to Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-2

NEW YORK–(BUSINESS WIRE)–

Link to Fitch Ratings’ Report: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-2 — Appendix

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=863049

Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to two groups in Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-2:

Group 1 Securities

–$75,728,000 class 1A1 ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Stable;

–$77,368,033 initial exchangeable class 1A2 not rated;

–$9,678,000 subsequent exchangeable class 1A3 ‘BBsf’; Outlook Stable;

–$9,072,000 subsequent exchangeable class 1A4 ‘Bsf’; Outlook Stable;

–$58,618,033 subsequent exchangeable class 1A5 not rated;

–$18,750,000 subsequent exchangeable class 1A6 ‘Bsf’; Outlook Stable;

–$43,964,000 subsequent exchangeable class 1A7 not rated;

–$14,654,033 subsequent exchangeable class 1A8 not rated.

Group 2 Securities

–$26,758,000 class 2A1 ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Stable;

–$12,569,031 class 2A2 not rated.

CMLTI 2015-2 is comprised of five groups. Fitch is rating five bonds from two of the groups. Two of the rated classes are the most senior tranche while the other three are subsequent exchangeable securities from group 1. Each group is a resecuritization of an ownership interest in a residential mortgage-backed security. As a resecuritization, the securities will receive their cash-flow from the underlying security. The Fitch-rated groups are collateralized with a senior class from Alt-A transactions issued from 2006 to 2007. Collateral performance has shown improvement over the past few years. The underlying pools have exhibited significant declines in the percentage of loans seriously delinquent. Also, the percentage of loans transitioning from current to delinquent has slowed as well.

For the Fitch rated groups, interest is paid pro-rata and principal is paid sequentially. Realized losses are applied reverse sequentially.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Key rating drivers include the performance of the underlying pool as well as the collateral characteristics, such as sustainable loan-to-value ratio (sLTV), credit score and geographic concentration. For the Fitch rated groups, Fitch ran various prepayment speeds and loss timing scenarios in its analysis of the deal structure. This analysis was done to determine that the cash flow to the Fitch rated bonds would not be exposed to losses as a result of potential alternative cash flow timing stress scenarios.

Based on the collateral composition of the Group 1 underlying pool, Fitch assumed a base-case scenario expected loss (XL) of 34%. In the rating stress scenarios, Fitch assumed a ‘BBBsf’ XL of 51.33%, a ‘BBsf’ XL of 45.53% and a ‘Bsf’ XL of 40.13. Fitch ran these loss assumptions through 12 different interest rate, prepayment and timing scenarios and used the most conservative value to determine the required credit enhancement (CE). The required CE to support a ‘BBBsf’ rating is 50.54%, a ‘BBsf’ rating is 44.21% and a ‘Bsf’ rating is 38.29%. The lower CE compared to the XL is due to the underlying deal structure, which allows for excess spread.

Based on the collateral composition of the Group 2 underlying pool, Fitch assumed a base-case scenario XL of 20%. In the rating stress scenarios, Fitch assumed a ‘BBBsf’ XL of 33.8%. Fitch increased the model-expected loss severity on liquidated loans by 10% at each rating scenario to better reflect recent loss severity trends. Fitch ran the loss assumptions through 12 different interest rate, prepayment and timing scenarios and used the most conservative value to determine the required credit enhancement (CE). The required CE to support a ‘BBBsf’ rating is 31.96%. The lower CE compared to the XL is due to the underlying class, which still had roughly 3.5% of CE.

Fitch is assigning the ratings based on underlying pool collateral composition, the results of its cashflow analysis, review of final structure and supporting deal documents.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch analyzes each bond in a number of different scenarios to determine the likelihood of full principal recovery and timely interest. The scenario analysis incorporates various combinations of the following stressed assumptions: mortgage loss, loss timing, interest rates, prepayments, servicer advancing and loan modifications.

The analysis includes rating stress scenarios from ‘CCCsf’ to ‘AAAsf’. The ‘CCCsf’ scenario is intended to be the most likely base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above ‘CCCsf’ are increasingly more stressful and less likely outcomes. Although many variables are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the ‘Bsf’ scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline in the ‘AAAsf’ scenario.

The group-to-bond association for the Fitch-rated groups are as follows:

–Group 1 represents a 100% interest in the Lehman XS Trust, Series 2007-7N class 2A1A;

–Group 2 represents a 20.70% interest in the Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-AR15 Trust Class 1A.

Additional information is available in the ‘Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-2 Representations and Warranties Appendix, published Feb. 27 and available at ‘www.fitchratings.com‘.

Additional information is available at ‘www.fitchratings.com‘.

Applicable Criteria and Related Research:

–‘Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria’ (May 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Master Rating Criteria,’ (July 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Surveillance and Re-REMIC Criteria’ (June 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria’ (November 2014);

–‘Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered Bonds’ (May 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Cash Flow Analysis Criteria’ (April 2014);

–‘Criteria for Interest Rate Stresses in Structured Finance Transactions and Covered Bonds’ (December 2014);

–‘Rating Criteria for US Residential and Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Servicers’ (January 2014).

Applicable Criteria and Related Research:

Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered Bonds

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=744158

Criteria for Interest Rate Stresses in Structured Finance Transactions and Covered Bonds

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=838868

Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=754389

U.S. RMBS Master Rating Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=750719

U.S. RMBS Surveillance and Re-REMIC Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=750110

U.S. RMBS Cash Flow Analysis Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=746027

Rating Criteria for US Residential and Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Servicers

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=731747

U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=810788

Additional Disclosure

Solicitation Status

http://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/disclosure/solicitation?pr_id=980536

ALL FITCH CREDIT RATINGS ARE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS. PLEASE READ THESE LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS BY FOLLOWING THIS LINK: HTTP://FITCHRATINGS.COM/UNDERSTANDINGCREDITRATINGS. IN ADDITION, RATING DEFINITIONS AND THE TERMS OF USE OF SUCH RATINGS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE AGENCY’S PUBLIC WEBSITE ‘WWW.FITCHRATINGS.COM‘. PUBLISHED RATINGS, CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THIS SITE AT ALL TIMES. FITCH’S CODE OF CONDUCT, CONFIDENTIALITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AFFILIATE FIREWALL, COMPLIANCE AND OTHER RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE ‘CODE OF CONDUCT’ SECTION OF THIS SITE. FITCH MAY HAVE PROVIDED ANOTHER PERMISSIBLE SERVICE TO THE RATED ENTITY OR ITS RELATED THIRD PARTIES. DETAILS OF THIS SERVICE FOR RATINGS FOR WHICH THE LEAD ANALYST IS BASED IN AN EU-REGISTERED ENTITY CAN BE FOUND ON THE ENTITY SUMMARY PAGE FOR THIS ISSUER ON THE FITCH WEBSITE.

FinanceInvestment & Company InformationFitch Ratings Contact:

Fitch Ratings

Primary Analyst

Ryan O’Loughlin

Analyst

+1-212-908-0387

Fitch Ratings, Inc., 33 Whitehall Street, New York, NY 10004

or

Secondary Analyst

Grant Bailey

Managing Director

+1-212-908-0544

or

Committee Chairperson

Rui Pereira

Managing Director

+1-212-908-0766

or

Media Relations:

Sandro Scenga, +1-212-908-0278 (New York)

sandro.scenga@fitchratings.com […]

CMA finalises proposals to lower payday loan costs – Press releases …

The measures follow the conclusion of a 20-month investigation into the market by a group of independent Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) panel members. The group published its provisional findings in June 2014 and then consulted on its intended proposals the following October.

Online payday lenders will be ordered by the CMA to publish details of their products on at least one price comparison website (PCW) which is authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). To ensure that they operate to appropriate standards, the CMA has recommended to the FCA that authorised PCWs should provide customers with clear, objective and comparable information on all potential loan costs, in particular the total amount payable, and have the ability for customers to compare different loans by searching easily on the most relevant features such as loan amount and duration. The CMA believes that one or more commercial PCWs will emerge and be authorised by the FCA, but if this does not happen, lenders will be obliged to set up an FCA authorised PCW.

The CMA has also made recommendations to the FCA to take steps to:

improve the disclosure of late fees and other additional charges help customers to shop around without unduly affecting their ability to access credit improve real-time data sharing between lenders and credit reference agencies ensure that lead generators – websites which sell potential borrowers’ details to lenders and through which 40% of first-time online borrowers access their loans – explain how they operate much more clearly to customers

Finally, online and high street payday lenders will be ordered by the CMA to provide existing customers with a summary of their cost of borrowing. The summary will tell borrowers what the total cost of their most recent loan was, as well as the cumulative cost of their borrowing with that lender over the previous 12 months and how late repayment affected their cost of borrowing.

The measures are designed to tackle problems identified in the final report, where the CMA found that a lack of price competition between lenders has led to higher costs for borrowers. Most borrowers do not shop around – partly because of the difficulties in accessing clear and comparable information on the cost of borrowing and a lack of awareness of late fees and additional charges. Without the pressure to drive down costs, lenders have tended to price their loans at similar levels whilst competing on other factors such as speed – often the initial priority for borrowers.

The CMA also found that many borrowers believe that lead generators are themselves lenders, rather than simply intermediaries. Even where they understand this, most customers are unaware that, rather than matching borrowers with the most suitable or cheapest loan on offer, lead generators sell borrowers’ details to lenders based on how much lenders are prepared to pay for the details, generally selling them to the highest bidder. As a result the CMA does not consider that lead generators have been effective in promoting price competition between lenders even though they have helped to promote the entry into the market of additional lenders.

The CMA’s remedies follow the FCA’s introduction of a price cap for the sector which came into force on 2 January 2015, which is in addition to a number of other FCA measures to increase customer protection that the FCA has introduced over the past year.

Simon Polito, Chair of the CMA’s Payday Lending Investigation Group, said:

The payday lending market is undergoing substantial change as a result of FCA initiatives to eradicate unacceptable practices. Our actions complement the FCA’s measures and are aimed at making the market more competitive and further driving down costs for borrowers.

We expect that millions of customers will continue to rely on payday loans. Most customers take out several loans a year and the total cost of paying too much for payday loans can build up over time. During our investigation, we found that there was often a substantial difference in this market between the most expensive and cheapest deals.

The FCA’s price cap will reduce the overall level of prices and the scale of the price differentials but we want to ensure more competition so that the cap does not simply become the benchmark price set by lenders for payday loans. We think costs can be driven lower and want to ensure that customers are able to take advantage of price competition to further reduce the cost of their loans. Only price competition will incentivise lenders to reduce the cost borrowers pay for their loans.

Even where borrowers do shop around at present, it is difficult for them to compare prices between short-term loans given the differences between products and the limited usefulness of the APR in making comparisons. Few customers find their lender via existing price comparison websites, which suffer from a number of limitations.

To help them, we are requiring lenders to be listed on price comparison websites authorised by the FCA and have recommended to the FCA that these websites should carry all the information customers need to compare easily the total cost of different lenders’ loans. This will promote competition and provide the incentive for new and existing lenders to compete to offer lower cost loans and win borrowers’ business. It will also make it easier for new entrants that offer lower cost loans to access customers.

We have worked closely with the FCA throughout the investigation and are pleased that the FCA is fully supportive of the remedies in our final report.

In developing these measures the CMA has carried out customer research to inform the design of its remedy package and has consulted extensively with consumer groups and debt charities, lenders, intermediaries, trade associations and a range of other market participants, as well as with the FCA. The CMA will publish an order within 6 months putting in place its requirements in relation to PCWs and borrowing summaries. The FCA will consult in the summer of 2015 on the measures to be introduced in response to the recommendations. The CMA will work closely with the FCA to implement the recommendations.

The final report and all other information on the investigation are available on the payday lending case page.

Notes for editors

  1. The CMA is the UK’s primary competition and consumer authority. It is an independent non-ministerial government department with responsibility for carrying out investigations into mergers, markets and the regulated industries and enforcing competition and consumer law. From 1 April 2014 it took over the functions of the Competition Commission (CC) and the competition and certain consumer functions of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), as amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.
  2. The members of the Payday Lending Investigation Group are: Simon Polito (Chairman of the group), Katherine Holmes, Ray King and Tim Tutton. Read more on how market investigations are conducted. The OFT referred the payday lending market to the CC on 27 June 2013.
  3. All the CMA’s functions in market investigations are performed by inquiry groups chosen from the CMA’s panel members. In such investigations, the appointed inquiry group are the decision-makers.
  4. The CMA’s panel members come from a variety of backgrounds, including economics, law, accountancy and/or business. The membership of an inquiry group usually reflects a mix of expertise and experience (including industry experience).
  5. Following a market investigation the CMA may take action itself, by making an order or accepting undertakings from parties. The CMA may also recommend that action be taken by others such as government, regulators and public authorities. Where the CMA makes such a recommendation, it will be for the person to whom the recommendation is addressed to decide whether to take the recommended course of action.
  6. The FCA assumed responsibility for consumer credit regulation from 1 April 2014, having announced its proposals for regulating consumer credit in October 2013 and confirming additional rules for payday lenders in July 2014. Measures by the FCA to strengthen consumer protection have meant closer regulation of lenders over issues such as limiting rollovers, restrictions on the use of Continuous Payment Authorities to recover debt from a borrower’s bank account, the carrying out of proper affordability checks and sensitive treatment of debt problems. In November 2014, the FCA confirmed details of the price cap which was subsequently introduced on 2 January 2015. On the same day the FCA also introduced rules to address some of the concerns around lead generators identified in the final report which were first highlighted by the CMA in its provisional findings.
  7. Enquiries should be directed to Rory Taylor, (rory.taylor@cma.gsi.gov.uk) or Siobhan Allen, (siobhan.allen@cma.gsi.gov.uk) or by ringing 020 3738 6798 or 020 3738 6460.
  8. For more information on the CMA, see our homepage, or follow us on Twitter @CMAgovuk, Flickr and LinkedIn. Sign up to our email alerts to receive updates on markets cases.

[…]

Dangers of applying for an online payday loan

As consumers move their financial activities online, applying online for a payday loan may seem like the natural thing for a cash-strapped person to do.

But you could be setting yourself up for a world of hurt, from paying exorbitant interest rates to having funds swiped from your bank account to being threatened by debt collectors. Just filling out an application could be enough to begin the harassment and thievery.

“Absolutely the worst thing you can do is apply for an online payday loan,” says Jay Speer, executive director of the Virginia Poverty Law Center.

Most online payday loan sites aren’t even operated by lenders. They’re run by “lead generators,” who seek your personal information, such as Social Security number, driver’s license number and bank account details. They then sell that information to lenders.

“Your email and telephone explode after that,” Speer says, as lenders vie to offer you cash. That can happen even if you live in one of the 15 states where payday loans are illegal.

Lenders aren’t the only ones in the market for your personal information. “There’s a good chance they sell to fraudsters — people who come after you months or years later,” he says.

Sandra Green (not her real name) has experienced this firsthand. The Virginia woman turned to online payday loans after her husband was injured and couldn’t work for two years. Their credit was damaged and they couldn’t get cash to pay their bills from traditional financial institutions.

Green took out several loans totaling $3,000 to $4,000 starting around 2010. The lenders that she received cash from took their payments from her bank account — but they weren’t the only ones. A company she had never heard of swiped money from her account, creating an overdraft.

She filled out a request for the bank to stop payment. That worked for about six months, and then the withdrawals started again. “People will change the identity of the company and then they’ll hit it (the account) again. Once they do this it’s a never-ending cycle,” she says.

Companies she’d never done business with would call her at work and at home, harassing her. One threatened to file papers with the local sheriff’s office if she didn’t pay immediately.

“They get really belligerent when you don’t do what they want you to do,” Green recalls.

She feared she’d wind up in bankruptcy because of the loans and finally sought help from Blue Ridge Legal Services, a Virginia legal aid society, in 2013. Blue Ridge connected her with the Virginia Poverty Law Center.

Speer says of online payday lenders: “These people are like sharks. If you give them some money it’s like throwing blood in the water.”

Payday loans are generally described as small, short-term loans. A consumer writes a check for the amount borrowed, plus a fee. The lender advances money against the check and the check is held until the next payday, when the loan and fees must be paid. Or, in the practice used by most online lenders, a consumer can grant the lender access to his bank account, and the lender electronically accesses the account to deposit money and withdraw payment.

Even paying back legitimate loans carries astronomical costs. Green took out a loan of $350. It took six weeks for her to pay it back, and she paid nearly $300 in fees.

Online payday loans boom
Her experiences are not uncommon. “Fraud and Abuse Online: Harmful Practices in Internet Payday Lending,” a 2014 study by the Pew Charitable Trusts, found online installment payday loans typically have an APR of 300 percent to more than 700 percent. Online lump-sum payday loans have a typical APR of 650 percent, or $25 per $100 borrowed per pay period. Exorbitant fees are also charged, and initial payments might not be applied to the loan’s principal.

Online payday lending is big business. Revenue tripled from $1.4 billion in 2006 to $4.1 billion, according to Pew.

Of the more than 250 online payday borrowers surveyed by Pew, almost 40 percent said their personal information was sold to a third party without their knowledge. Nearly one-third had an unauthorized withdrawal from their account.

Threats were common, with 30 percent of those surveyed saying they were threatened by an online lender or debt collector.

“Harassment and fraud are really concentrated in the online lending market,” says Nick Bourke, project director for Pew’s study on payday loans.

Part of the problem stems from the fact that there’s no control over who can get your information once you apply for an online payday loan. “People’s personal information can be spread far and wide,” Bourke says.

Even if the loans are fraudulent, a consumer’s failure to pay them may be reported to one of the three main credit bureaus, Speer says, which can impact a consumer’s ability to rent an apartment or land a job.

Many storefront payday lenders are fed up with the behavior of these online payday lenders.

“These unlawful lenders roam the Internet trolling for customers. They are scammers. They are fraudsters,” says Amy Cantu, spokeswoman for the Community Financial Services Association of America, which represents more than half of the country’s storefront payday lenders.

Though online payday lenders represent just one-third of the marketplace, 90 percent of payday lending complaints filed with the Better Business Bureau are aimed at them, according to Pew.

Self-regulation efforts
Association members vow to adhere to the organization’s best practices, which include complying with state and federal laws, being licensed in each state in which they do business and adhering to acceptable debt collection practices.

Some of the association’s larger members also have an online presence, she says, but those sites also adhere to the organization’s best practices.

Cantu says she understands that consumers with financial troubles may prefer the anonymity of the Internet when seeking cash, rather than walking into a storefront payday lender. But online lenders are supposed to only operate in the states that allow payday lending.

Her organization wants the federal consumer watchdog agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to crack down on illegal lenders.

Agencies crack down
Already the CFPB and the Federal Trade Commission are stepping up action against fraudsters. In a joint news conference in September, the agencies announced they’d filed suit against two online payday lenders.

The CFPB sued Kansas City-based Hydra Group, while the FTC sued CWB Services, also based in Kansas City.

The CFPB received more than 1,300 consumer complaints about the Hydra Group.

At the news conference, CFBP Director Richard Cordray accused the Hydra Group of “running an illegal cash-grab scam to force purported loans on people without their prior consent. It is an incredibly brazen and deceptive scheme.”

Both the Hydra Group and CWB Services were accused of buying personal information, including bank account numbers, from lead generators. The companies would deposit money into consumers’ bank accounts without any signed agreements, and then make unauthorized withdrawals from the accounts. If a consumer complained, the companies would produce false loan documents.

In 15 months, the Hydra Group made $97.3 million in loans and collected $115.4 million from consumers.

Even if consumers closed their accounts, their information might have been sold to debt collectors, who then attempted to collect more money.

A federal judge temporarily shut down the Hydra Group, freezing its assets. The CFPB is requesting a permanent shutdown, along with penalties imposed upon the company and refunds made to consumers.

With CWB Services, the federal court froze the company’s assets and appointed a receivership and the FTC is requesting consumers’ money be refunded. The company had raked in $46 million in 11 months, said Jessica Rich, the FTC’s director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection.

Bourke says the CFPB should ensure that small loans are tailored to the borrower’s ability to pay them off and should provide more protection to consumers, particularly against illegal debt collection practices.

“The core of the problem is that payday loans don’t help people. They drive people further into debt and distress,” he says.

See related:Know your credit card fraudster

,

Know your rights under the Truth in Lending Act

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New protections from financial ‘gotchas’ in 2015Dangers of applying for an online payday loanCFPB orders refunds for 98,000 subprime cardholdersFighting back against the growing threat of tax fraudFinanceLoanspayday loanbank account […]

Are Your Student Loan Payments Higher Than Necessary?

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Source: Tulane Public Relations via Flickr.

If you’re among the millions of Americans who make student loan payments each month, it’s important to know all of the repayment options available to you. Certain plans could lower your monthly payments, freeing up more of your cash.

Here’s an overview of the most advantageous repayment plans, along with the pros and cons of reducing your payment.

The Pay As You Earn plan
The Pay As You Earn is designed to keep your payments low when you’re fresh out of school and not earning much money. Then, as your income grows, so do your repayments.

The required payment amount is actually quite low: It’s capped at either 10% of your discretionary income or what your payment would be under a standard 10-year repayment plan. For the purposes of this calculation, your discretionary income is the difference between your income and 150% of the poverty guidelines for your family size and state of residence.

As an example, let’s say you earn $60,000 per year, live in any of the 48 contiguous states or Washington, D.C. (the poverty guidelines are only different for Alaska and Hawaii), and are married with one child (family size of three). The poverty guideline for 2015 is $20,090, and 150% of that amount is $30,135. Therefore your discretionary income is $60,000 minus $30,135, which comes to $29,865. Divide this over 12 months and apply the 10% rule, and you can see that your monthly payment would be capped at about $250, no matter how high your student loan balance is.

Now, the most common concern I hear is that such a low payment may not even cover the interest on the loans, and therefore it could take decades to pay off the balance. However, under the Pay As You Earn plan, any remaining loan balance will be forgiven after 20 years of on-time payments, regardless of how much is left.

It’s also worth noting that Pay As You Earn isn’t available to all borrowers yet. It was announced last year that the program will be available to all borrowers by the end of 2015, but for now it’s only open to borrowers who took out their first loan after October 2007. For those who are currently ineligible, the Income-Based Repayment, or IBR, plan, offers similar benefits: The payment cap is slightly higher at 15% of discretionary income, and any remaining balance is forgiven after 25 years.

Extended repayment
If you’d prefer payments that stay the same over the years but find the 10-year repayment plan a little too expensive, there’s also the option of an extended repayment plan, which spreads your payments over a longer time frame (up to 25 years). This tends to be an appealing option for people who earn too much to take full advantage of the Pay As You Earn plan but find the 10-year payment amount to be too high to manage along with their other expenses.

Another advantage of the extended option is that your loan balance will go down over time, which can provide a nice boost to your credit score. According to the FICO scoring formula, 30% of your score comes from “amounts owed,” which takes into account, ;among other things, the remaining balances on your loan relative to the original loan amount.

The downsides of choosing the extended repayment plan are that you’ll never be eligible for loan forgiveness as you would with the Pay As You Earn plan, and you’ll end up paying a lot more interest over the life of the loan than you would under a standard 10-year repayment plan.

For example, if you owe $35,000 in student loans at 6% interest, your monthly payment under the standard 10-year plan would be $389 per month. So, over the life of the loan, you’ll pay $11,680 in interest. However, if you choose to pay it back over 25 years, your monthly payment falls to about $225, but you’ll end up paying $32,650 in interest.

The downside to lower payments
As with anything else in life, there are pros and cons to all repayment options, including Pay as You Earn and extended repayment. As I mentioned before, you’ll end up paying more interest with an extended repayment plan than with a standard repayment plan, and if your income increases over the years, this could be the case with Pay As You Earn as well.

And with Pay As You Earn, remember that your payments will rise in proportion to your income, and this could cause a rather sharp increase if you get a raise or a higher-paying job. In the earlier example of a borrower who earns $60,000 per year, a promotion to a job paying $80,000 per year (33% raise) would increase the allowable loan payment from $250 to $415 (67% increase). With a raise that size, a higher loan payment isn’t the end of the world, but it’s definitely something to keep in mind.

Aside from these drawbacks, the Pay as You Earn plan and the extended repayment plan can be excellent ways to manage your student loan expenses while still building up a solid payment history.

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[…]

Protesters speak out against the payday loan industry

Tuesday, January 27, 2015 | 10:00 p.m. CST; updated 11:53 p.m. CST, Tuesday, January 27, 2015

COLUMBIA — Two men in hazardous materials suits approached the Quik Cash at 219 E. Broadway on Tuesday afternoon with a roll of yellow caution tape in their hands.

The men were “quarantining” what they consider a toxic payday loan business, joined by about 10 other consumer advocates and Grass Roots Organizing protesters hoping to incite changes in the practices of the payday loan industry.

The group chanted as cars drove by and honked their support.

“Say no to payday lender lies! They only want their fees to rise! They offer toxic loans to poor and wonder why we say no more!” the protesters shouted.

“We have been working on this issue for a long time,” organizer Robin Acree said. “We wanted to raise attention to the toxic loans in Missouri and the debt trap that they cause. They are taking advantage of a low-income workforce.”

Payday loan businesses such as Quik Cash offer short-term, high-interest loans to walk-in customers who secure the loans with their next paycheck. In 2012, the average 14-day loan issued in Missouri held an average annual percentage rate of approximately 455 percent, according to a state Division of Finance report.

The protesters said the businesses intentionally give loans to people who cannot afford to make the payments, add the high interest rates and continually loan out more money to pay for the original debt when the customer cannot pay.

Missouri caps interest rates at 75 percent for the duration of the loan, but that cap corresponds to an annual percentage rate of 1,950 percent for a 14-day loan.

Acree said she does not want the payday loans industry to do business in Columbia and would rather low-income wages be raised to prevent people from needing the loans.

The Rev. Joseph Wilson spoke at the protest representing Faith Voices of Columbia and told the protesters about his own problems with payday loans. He said he took out a loan for $700 for regular expenses and it took him almost three years and $3,500 to pay it off.

“We were fortunate to get out of it. I had several loans all around town under the stress of trying to get out of it, and I couldn’t,” Wilson said. “It was a trap, and if I’d have known then what I know now, I never would have done it. It’s not set up to get you out.”

Gov. Jay Nixon vetoed a bill last year that would have reduced the interest rate limit to 35 percent for the duration of the loan, or 912 percent on a 14-day loan, and banned loan renewals. But the bill would have also repealed a law limiting loans to six rollovers and allowed extended payment plans.

New bills aiming to reform the payday loan industry entered both houses of the Missouri General Assembly earlier this month.

Senate Bill 187 would prohibit payday loan operators to charge interest and bar renewals on the loans, eliminating the current allowance of six renewals. Under the bill, payday loaners would only be able to charge fees that would be refunded to a borrower when a loan is repaid.

The bill would also extend loan periods to 30, 60 or 90 days from the current 14 and 31-day standards and prohibit lenders from making more than one loan to a single customer.

House Bill 91 would classify any loan less than $750 as a payday loan, up from the current $500 standard. It would allow for two loan renewals, but borrowers would not be allowed to have more than $750 in outstanding loans at one time.

It would also prohibit a lender from making a loan to a customer who already has one unsecured loan.

But the protesters weren’t looking to state legislators for help. They called through a megaphone for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau director Richard Cordray to make the changes that legislation has yet to accomplish.

“Payday loans are toxic! They make me sick! CFPD, show me logic and make rules quick!” they chanted.

Supervising editor is Austin Huguelet.

[…]

Protesters seek limits on payday lenders

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Protesters from the anti-poverty advocacy group ACORN rally outside a new Cash Money payday loan store on Kingsway at Griffiths. The group says the City of Burnaby should limit the number of such outlets and their proximity to each other.

— image credit: MARIO BARTEL/NEWSLEADER

Their chants expended, a small group of protestors from the anti-poverty advocacy group ACORN tucked their placards under their arms on Tuesday and strolled from in front of a Cash Money payday loan outlet at Kingsway and Griffiths to a Money Mart 200 metres east.

Which was just the reason for their ire.

Monica McGovern, the chairperson of ACORN’s Burnaby chapter, said there’s too many short-term lending establishments too close to each other in the city. That makes it too easy for low-income people who may not use conventional banks to access expensive loans.

Eventually they’re snowed under by their obligations to the lenders, further miring them in poverty, said McGovern.

“This is the poor they’re exploiting,” said McGovern. “They set people up for failure.”

The Cash Money outlet where ACORN members protested opened on Jan. 14.

But with another pay day lender close by already, McGovern said it’s time the City of Burnaby start limiting the licenses for such establishments.

“We’re concerned because these stores keep on popping up,” said McGovern.

Their proximity to each other allows clients from skirting provincial regulations that prevent a pay day lender from advancing money if the client already has an outstanding loan to that lender; the customer just has to walk down the street to get the money, along with the increased debt.

But fighting that regulatory battle, along with high interest rates such lenders charge – up to 23 per cent – is ongoing, said McGovern.

Meanwhile, municipalities like Burnaby can take steps to restrict the access impoverished people have to payday lenders.

“We urge city council to address this issue and limit the proliferation of these businesses,” said McGovern who pointed out nothing has happened at the civic level since ACORN made a presentation to council last February.

The issue was referred to the Community Development Committee for further study.

In April the City of Surrey proposed an amendment to its bylaws to create at least 400 metres separation between payday loan stores.

[…]

Teranga Gold Retires Balance of Loan Facility, Increases Cash Balance and Announces Second Highest Quarterly Production

TORONTO, ONTARIO–(Marketwired – Jan 8, 2015) –

(All amounts are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise stated)

Teranga Gold Corporation (“Teranga” or the “Company”) (TGZ.TO)(TGZ.AX) is pleased to report that it has retired the outstanding balance of its loan facility and increased its cash and cash equivalents balance to $35.7 million during the fourth quarter of 2014. Fourth quarter production totaled 71,278 ounces from its Sabodala Gold Mine in Senegal, putting full-year 2014 production results at 211,823 ounces.

Strengthened Balance Sheet with Retired Loan Facility and Higher Cash Balance

As expected, Teranga retired the outstanding $15.0 million balance of its loan facility (“Facility”) with Macquarie Bank Limited on December 31st. The Company began the year with $60.0 million outstanding under the Facility, of which $30.0 million was repaid on January 15th, 2014 with the completion of the streaming agreement with Franco-Nevada Corporation as part of the acquisition of the Oromin Joint Venture Group Ltd. The balance of $30.0 million was repaid in three quarterly $5.0 million installments, with the final outstanding balance of $15.0 million paid on December 31st. The Company ended the year with $35.7 million in cash and cash equivalents, an increase of $7.7 million over the third quarter cash and cash equivalents balance (including restricted cash).

Strong Quarterly Gold Production

Production was marginally lower than fourth quarter guidance primarily due to slightly lower recovery rates than planned. The fourth quarter saw record quarterly mill throughput of 1,009,038 tonnes milled contributing to the second highest quarterly production of 71,278 ounces. Ore was sourced from both the Sabodala and Masato pits, with soft ore from the recently developed Masato pit contributing to higher throughput rates. Gold production of 71,278 ounces during the fourth quarter of 2014 was 47 percent higher than third quarter production in 2014, and 36 percent higher compared to the same prior year period. Full year production of 211,823 ounces represents the second highest production total in Company history.

Fourth Quarter and Year-End Results Release

The Company will release its 2014 fourth quarter and year-end operating results for ASX listing purposes on Thursday, January 29th, 2015, after market close in Toronto. A conference call and webcast will be hosted following the release with access details to be available on the Company’s website. Full 2014 fourth quarter and year-end financial results are expected to be released during the week of February 16th, 2015.

ABOUT TERANGA GOLD

Teranga is a Canadian-based gold company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TGZ.TO) and Australian Securities Exchange (TGZ.AX). Teranga is principally engaged in the production and sale of gold, as well as related activities such as exploration and mine development.

Teranga’s mission is to create value for all of its stakeholders through responsible mining. Its vision is to explore, discover and develop gold mines in West Africa, in accordance with the highest international standards, and to be a catalyst for sustainable economic, environmental and community development. All of its actions from exploration, through development, operations and closure will be based on the best available techniques.

[…]

Fitch Rates Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-12

NEW YORK–(BUSINESS WIRE)–

Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating Outlooks to one group in Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-12 Group 3 Securities:

–$32,493,000 class 3A1 ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Stable.

Fitch is not expected to rate the following class:

–$10,127,235 class 3A2.

CMLTI 2014-12 is composed of three groups. Fitch is rating one bond in one of the groups (Bond 3A1 in group 3). Each group is a resecuritization of an ownership interest in a residential mortgage-backed security. As a resecuritization, the securities will receive their cash-flow from the underlying security. The Fitch-rated group is collateralized with class 6-A-1 from Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7. While the mortgage pool has performed worse than initial expectations, performance has stabilized and improved in recent years.

Fitch’s stressed mortgage pool loss assumption in the ‘BBBsf’ rating scenario is approximately 21% of the underlying pool. Fitch assumes home prices decline 20% below their sustainable levels in a ‘BBBsf’ rating scenario. The principal balances of all subordinate classes of the underlying transaction have been entirely written down and the underlying class has already experienced writedowns.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Key rating drivers include the performance of the underlying pool as well as the collateral characteristics, such as sustainable loan-to-value ratio (sLTV), credit score and geographic concentration. For the Fitch rated group, Fitch ran various prepayment speeds and loss timing scenarios in its analysis of the deal structure. This analysis was done to determine that the cash flow to the senior bond rated by Fitch would not be exposed to losses as a result of potential alternative cash flow timing stress scenarios.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch analyzes each bond in a number of different scenarios to determine the likelihood of full principal recovery and timely interest. The scenario analysis incorporates various combinations of the following stressed assumptions: mortgage loss, loss timing, interest rates, prepayments, servicer advancing and loan modifications.

The analysis includes rating stress scenarios from ‘CCCsf’ to ‘AAAsf’. The ‘CCCsf’ scenario is intended to be the most likely base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above ‘CCCsf’ are increasingly more stressful and have less likely outcomes. Although many variables are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the ‘Bsf’ scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline in the ‘AAAsf’ scenario.

The group-to-bond association for the Fitch-rated group is as follows: Group 3 represents a 54.69% interest in the Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7, Class 6-A-1. Fitch’s ‘BBBsf’ rating for class 3A1 reflects the credit risk of the underlying transaction and the additional subordination provided by the new resecuritization trust. The underlying collateral pool for Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7, class 6-A-1 consists entirely of hybrid ARM mortgage loans. As of Nov. 25, 2014, Fitch estimates the loans remaining in the underlying pool had an original weighted average (WAVG) credit score of 716 and an estimated current combined loan-to-value of 82%. The top three state concentrations are California (32%), Florida (11%) and Arizona (8%). Approximately 10% of the remaining pool is delinquent.

For further information, see Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-12 Representations and Warranties Appendix, published today.

Additional information is available at ‘www.fitchratings.com‘.

Applicable Criteria and Related Research:

–‘Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria’ (May 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Master Rating Criteria,’ (July 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Surveillance and Re-REMIC Criteria’ (June 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria’ (November 2014);

–‘Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered Bonds’ (May 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Cash Flow Analysis Criteria’ (April 2014);

–‘Criteria for Interest Rate Stresses in Structured Finance Transactions and Covered Bonds’ (January 2014);

–‘Rating Criteria for US Residential and Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Servicers’ (January 2014).

Applicable Criteria and Related Research: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-12 – Appendix

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=845528

U.S. RMBS Surveillance and Re-REMIC Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=750110

U.S. RMBS Master Rating Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=750719

Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=754389

Rating Criteria for US Residential and Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Servicers

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=731747

U.S. RMBS Cash Flow Analysis Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=746027

Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered Bonds

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=744158

U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria

http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=810788

Additional Disclosure

Solicitation Status

http://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/disclosure/solicitation?pr_id=961895

ALL FITCH CREDIT RATINGS ARE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS. PLEASE READ THESE LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS BY FOLLOWING THIS LINK: HTTP://FITCHRATINGS.COM/UNDERSTANDINGCREDITRATINGS. IN ADDITION, RATING DEFINITIONS AND THE TERMS OF USE OF SUCH RATINGS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE AGENCY’S PUBLIC WEBSITE ‘WWW.FITCHRATINGS.COM‘. PUBLISHED RATINGS, CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THIS SITE AT ALL TIMES. FITCH’S CODE OF CONDUCT, CONFIDENTIALITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AFFILIATE FIREWALL, COMPLIANCE AND OTHER RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE ‘CODE OF CONDUCT’ SECTION OF THIS SITE. FITCH MAY HAVE PROVIDED ANOTHER PERMISSIBLE SERVICE TO THE RATED ENTITY OR ITS RELATED THIRD PARTIES. DETAILS OF THIS SERVICE FOR RATINGS FOR WHICH THE LEAD ANALYST IS BASED IN AN EU-REGISTERED ENTITY CAN BE FOUND ON THE ENTITY SUMMARY PAGE FOR THIS ISSUER ON THE FITCH WEBSITE.

Security Upgrades & DowngradesFinanceFitch RatingsMortgage Loan Contact:

Fitch Ratings

Primary Analyst

Ryan O’Loughlin

Analyst

+1-212-908-0387

Fitch Ratings, Inc., 33 Whitehall Street, New York, NY 10004

or

Committee Chairperson

Grant Bailey

Managing Director

+1-212-908-0544

or

Media Relations:

Elizabeth Fogerty, +1-212-908-0526

elizabeth.fogerty@fitchratings.com […]

Fitch Rates CSMC Trust Series 2014-11R

NEW YORK–(BUSINESS WIRE)–

Fitch Ratings assigns a rating to one group of CSMC Trust series 2014-11R, a U.S. RMBS resecuritization:

Group 17 Securities

–$5,373,000 class 17-A-1 ‘BBBsf’.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Fitch is not expected to rate the following classes:

–$1,632,800 subsequent exchangeable class 17-A-2;

–$816,000 initial exchangeable class 17-A-3;

–$816,800 initial exchangeable class 17-A-4.

CSMC 2014-11R is comprised of 17 groups. Fitch is rating one bond in one of the groups (Bond 17-A-1 in group 17). Each group is a resecuritization of an ownership interest in a residential mortgage-backed security. As a resecuritization, the securities will receive their cash-flow from the underlying security. The Fitch-rated group is collateralized with class A-2 from Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust series 2007-RAMP1. While the mortgage pool has performed worse than initial expectations, performance has stabilized and improved in recent years.

Fitch’s stressed mortgage pool loss assumption in the ‘BBBsf’ rating scenario is approximately 50% of the underlying pool. Fitch assumes home prices decline 20% below their sustainable levels in a ‘BBBsf’ rating scenario. The principal balances of all subordinate classes of the underlying transaction have been entirely written down. However, the underlying class A-2 benefits from a sequential payment priority that effectively provides approximately 38% subordination for principal recovery in the underlying transaction. The new resecuritization class 17-A-1 benefits from additional credit support of 23.3% as a percentage of the A-2 class (approximately 14% as a percentage of the underlying pool balance).

Ocwen Loan Servicing (Ocwen) is a primary servicer of the underlying mortgage pool. Fitch recently placed Ocwen’s servicer rating on Rating Watch Negative due to concerns raised by the New York State Department of Financial Services (NY DFS). The NY DFS has alleged significant issues with Ocwen’s systems and processes, especially relating to borrower requests for mortgage loan modifications. Ocwen’s increased risk is mitigated by the presence of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo; rated ‘RMS1’ by Fitch) as Master Servicer.

This transaction contains certain classes designated as Initial Exchangeable Securities and another as a Subsequent Exchangeable Securities.

For Group 17, classes 17-A-3 and 17-A-4 are Initial Exchangeable Securities and class 17-A-2 is a Subsequent Exchangeable Security. For the Fitch rated group, interest is paid pro-rata and principal is paid sequentially.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Key rating drivers include the performance of the underlying pool as well as the collateral characteristics, such as sustainable loan-to-value ratio (sLTV), credit score and geographic concentration. For the Fitch rated group, Fitch ran various prepayment speeds and loss timing scenarios in its analysis of the deal structure. This analysis was done to determine that the cash flow to the senior bond rated by Fitch would not be exposed to losses as a result of potential alternative cash flow timing stress scenarios.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch analyzes each bond in a number of different scenarios to determine the likelihood of full principal recovery and timely interest. The scenario analysis incorporates various combinations of the following stressed assumptions: mortgage loss, loss timing, interest rates, prepayments, servicer advancing and loan modifications.

The analysis includes rating stress scenarios from ‘CCCsf’ to ‘AAAsf’. The ‘CCCsf’ scenario is intended to be the most likely base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above ‘CCCsf’ are increasingly more stressful and less likely outcomes. Although many variables are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the ‘Bsf’ scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline in the ‘AAAsf’ scenario.

The group-to-bond association for the Fitch-rated group is as follows: Group Seventeen represents a 14.29% interest in the Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust series 2007-RAMP1, Class A-2. Fitch’s ‘BBBsf’ rating for class 17-A-1 reflects the credit risk of the underlying transaction and the additional subordination provided by the new resecuritization trust. The underlying collateral pool for Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust series 2007-RAMP1, class A-2 consists of fixed-rate and hybrid ARM mortgage loans. As of Nov. 25, 2014, Fitch estimates the loans remaining in the underlying pool had an original weighted average (WAVG) credit score of 689, an estimated current combined loan-to-value of 98% and a sustainable loan-to-value of 102%. The top three state concentrations are New York (12%), Florida (11%) and New Jersey (9%). Approximately 36.5% of the remaining pool is delinquent.

For further information, see CSMC Series 2014-11R Representations and Warranties Appendix, published December 2nd, 2014.

Additional information is available at ‘www.fitchratings.com‘.

Applicable Criteria and Related Research:

–‘Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria’ (May 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Master Rating Criteria,’ (July 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Surveillance and Re-REMIC Criteria’ (June 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria’ (November 2014);

–‘Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered Bonds’ (May 2014);

–‘U.S. RMBS Cash Flow Analysis Criteria’ (April 2014);

–‘Criteria for Interest Rate Stresses in Structured Finance Transactions and Covered Bonds’ (January 2014);

–‘Rating Criteria for US Residential and Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Servicers’ (January 2014).

Additional Disclosure

Solicitation Status

http://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/disclosure/solicitation?pr_id=961875

ALL FITCH CREDIT RATINGS ARE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS. PLEASE READ THESE LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS BY FOLLOWING THIS LINK: HTTP://FITCHRATINGS.COM/UNDERSTANDINGCREDITRATINGS. IN ADDITION, RATING DEFINITIONS AND THE TERMS OF USE OF SUCH RATINGS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE AGENCY’S PUBLIC WEBSITE ‘WWW.FITCHRATINGS.COM‘. PUBLISHED RATINGS, CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THIS SITE AT ALL TIMES. FITCH’S CODE OF CONDUCT, CONFIDENTIALITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AFFILIATE FIREWALL, COMPLIANCE AND OTHER RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE ‘CODE OF CONDUCT’ SECTION OF THIS SITE. FITCH MAY HAVE PROVIDED ANOTHER PERMISSIBLE SERVICE TO THE RATED ENTITY OR ITS RELATED THIRD PARTIES. DETAILS OF THIS SERVICE FOR RATINGS FOR WHICH THE LEAD ANALYST IS BASED IN AN EU-REGISTERED ENTITY CAN BE FOUND ON THE ENTITY SUMMARY PAGE FOR THIS ISSUER ON THE FITCH WEBSITE.

Security Upgrades & DowngradesFinanceFitch Ratings Contact:

Fitch Ratings

Primary Analyst

Ryan O’Loughlin

Analyst

+1-212-908-0387

Fitch Ratings, Inc.

33 Whitehall Street

New York, NY 10004

or

Committee Chairperson

Grant Bailey

Managing Director

+1-212-908-0544

or

Media Relations

Elizabeth Fogerty, +1 212-908-0526

elizabeth.fogerty@fitchratings.com […]